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Abstract 
Background: The enactment of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will 
impact on European data science. Particular concerns relating to consent 
requirements that would severely restrict medical data research have been raised. 
Objectives: To explain the changes in data protection laws that apply to medical 
research and to discuss their potential impact. 
Methods: Analysis of ethico-legal requirements imposed by the GDPR. 
Results: The GDPR makes the classification of pseudonymised data as personal 
data clearer, although it has not been entirely resolved. Biomedical research on 
personal data where consent has not been obtained must be of substantial public 
interest. 
Conclusions: The GDPR introduces protections for data subjects that aim for 
consistency across the EU. The proposed changes will make little impact on 
biomedical data research. 
Keywords: Pseudonymity, anonymity and untraceability; privacy-preserving 
protocols; informatics; data reporting; data protection; research ethics 
There have been significant developments in European Union (EU) data protection 
law recently that will have an impact on healthcare professionals particularly those 
engaged in research and audit. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has 
replaced the current legislation and comes into full effect in 2018. [1] The 
implications for the handling of healthcare data of the GDPR will be discussed in this 
paper. Despite the recent referendum vote in the UK to leave the EU, the GDPR will 
continue to be relevant to the UK, whether this is due to cooperation in European 
projects or because the UK continues to be a member of the European Economic 
Area (EEA). 
The Data Protection Directive 
Currently the relevant law in the UK is the Data Protection Act 1998, which is the 
UK’s transposition of the Data Protection Directive (DPD). European directives are 
not directly enforceable, requiring member states to pass legislation to comply with 
their requirements. There are derogations (legal exemptions) for research, which in 
the case of the UK have been criticized for being too broad. The LRDP Kantor report 
for the European Commission criticises the UK for disregard of the limitations, stating 
that the Data Protection Act blatantly violates the Directive by adding “medical 
research” to the list of medical purposes. [2] The DPD requires a “substantial public 
interest” for member states to add to the derogations for processing of sensitive 
personal data (Article 8.4). 
Differences between EU member states can result in research ethics committees in 
UK denying permission for NHS data to be transferred to other EU countries (the 
opposite might also be the case in some circumstances).[3] These differences have 
also contributed to the passage of the GDPR as part of the Digital Single Market 
strategy.[4] 
The law as it will be from 2018: the GDPR 
The text of the GDPR has recently been agreed after a prolonged trilogue between 
the European Commission, Parliament and Council of Ministers. [5] This legislation 
will replace the national transpositions of the DPD. Regulations are directly 
enforceable across the EU. The GDPR comes into full effect on May 25th 2018, 
although member states are permitted minor differences in interpretation (the 
European Court of Justice is the ultimate arbiter). This legislation has the potential to 
affect projects using research data banks and/or Big Data.[6, 7] There had been 
concerns that a clause inserted by the European Parliament requiring specific 
consent would prevent significant long-term epidemiological research taking place in 
the future,[8]but this was rejected and the agreed text permits broad consent to 
“certain areas of research when in keeping with recognised ethical standards” 
(Recital 33).[9] Broad consent is not blanket or open consent [10] although some 
commentators argue that blanket or open consent is acceptable for biobank and 
databank research as the risks are minimal and do not vary for different projects.[11] 
Another possibility is consent to a form of governance.[12] Open consent without any 
ongoing regulation or communication about proposed projects would be potentially 
problematic. Dynamic consent offers advantages for an engaged community of 
participants but might not be considered beneficial by some individuals.[13] 
The derogations for research without consent have been expanded to specifically 
include medical research where “in the public interest” (Recital 51). How public 
interest will be defined has not been elaborated, but European jurisprudence 
demands member states satisfy a high threshold where human rights are involved 
e.g. a “pressing social need”.[14] This standard would not be required for the 
conduct of medical research using databanks, but it might exclude all commercial 
research for “me too” drug development (drugs that offer no advantages over drugs 
already on the market), arrangements that have no evidence of benefit sharing, or 
simply require that projects address issues of public importance, regardless of the 
profits made.[15] This requirement reflects public attitudes in the UK to the use of 
healthcare data, where there is resistance to use of public data for commercial 
ventures unless the research could not happen without commercial involvement.[16, 
17] 
Anonymisation 
Data protection law only applies to personal data – that is, data that does directly or 
can indirectly identify an individual.[18-20] The simple deletion of name and address 
is usually insufficient to constitute anonymisation (it has been demonstrated that the 
combination of three pieces of data could identify 87% of US residents – five-digit zip 
code, birth date, and sex).[21] The UK Information Commissioner’s Office currently 
treats pseudonymised data as anonymous where it is used by a third party who does 
not possess the requisite key code. Truly anonymised data cannot be linked back to 
an individual (which means that verification of data is not possible by any means). 
Pseudonymised data typically has identifiers removed and replaced with a unique 
key code (there is also two-way cryptography; one-way cryptography is considered 
anonymised). This key code can be used to trace the data back to an individual, 
enabling any safety concerns to be acted upon and for data to be verified. This is the 
approach that the UK Care.data project on the use of NHS electronic health records 
for data research has been taking [22]. The GDPR will require changes in practice, 
as it confirms in Recital 26 that pseudonymised data must be treated as personal 
data (in line with the previous Article 29 Working Party opinion).[18] That position 
results from the increased vulnerability of data subjects who could potentially be 
identified compared to the protection afforded them with true anonymisation - if the 
key code is hacked, then all the data can be linked to an individual once more.  
Consent 
Consent presumed by failure to “opt-out” or change pre-ticked boxes will no longer 
be permitted (unless covered by the derogations) – consent will need to be by a 
“clear, affirmative action” (Article 4.11). These changes would have arguably made 
the abandoned Care.data project[23] illegal, despite the passage of enabling 
legislation that exempted general practitioners from the common law duty of 
confidentiality when fulfilling their contractual duties to pass on healthcare data. 
Care.data relied on an opt-out for legitimacy[22]. The exercise of this opt-out was not 
straightforward. The numbers opting out far exceeded the estimates and the capacity 
for the Health and Social Care Information Centre (now NHS Digital) to process in a 
timely manner. The problems included omission of those who opted out from calls for 
NHS screening programmes, even though this was not the intention of those 
exercising this right. NHS Digital currently relies on pseudonymisation, which the 
GDPR  states is categorized as a matter of law as personal data. It is not entirely 
clear whether or not third parties without access to the key code could treat 
pseudonymised data as anonymised (as is currently the case in the UK). Key codes 
are a potential vulnerability due to accidental or malicious disclosure, which is one of 
the justifications for pseudonymised data being classified as personal data. There 
are no clear indications that there are no future plans to use NHS patient data for 
research. 
Dame Fiona Caldicott reviewed arrangements because of the widespread concerns 
related to consent;[22] and her report led to the cancellation of the Care.data 
project.[23] The particular issues that were identified include the lack of information 
about Care.data that made exercising an opt-out an opaque process, the inadequate 
mechanisms for opting, and the failure of protection for rights and access to the NHS 
for those who opt out.  
The risk of re-identification in the future is impossible to quantify precisely, because it 
cannot be predicted what information will become public.[24] However, as with 
biobanks, the risks to individuals are lesser compared with studies of medical 
interventions.[25] Therefore authorization by research ethics committees is 
acceptable practice, with the requirement that opt-outs be respected unless there are 
exceptional circumstances. 
Although the GDPR comes into force in mid-2018, researchers need to prepare now 
for the changes it will bring to long-term epidemiological studies. In particular, the 
categorisation of pseudonymised data as personal will require action in some 
jurisdictions such as the UK and Greece.[26] The necessary accommodations will 
require an investment of resources, but this will hopefully ensure that subjects 
continue to have trust in the integrity of their healthcare data and the medical 
research community.[27] The GDPR may still apply should the UK cease to become 
a member state of the EU either because the UK is a member of the EEA or 
because the UK retains these instruments as law at least for the short term.[28]  
Although audit and research are treated differently in law, the boundaries between 
the two activities are blurred.[29] Audit is directly relevant to the monitoring and 
improvement of quality of healthcare; therefore, it is included as a primary use of 
data (Recitals 52-54 and Article 9.2 (h) and (i) of the GDPR make this clear). Audit 
and healthcare management are a primary use of healthcare data, and research is a 
secondary use – that is, it is a use different from the originally declared purpose 
(although it is designated a compatible purpose within the GDPR, but only for non-
sensitive data). If an audit compares healthcare systems to discover which is most 
effective, this can also be categorized as research as the practices are not compared 
to a gold standard, and there is a hypothesis being generated or even tested by 
finding associations. The recent furore surrounding the Royal Free Trust project in 
conjunction with Google DeepMind illustrates the debate over the distinction of audit 
from research.[30-32] 
Data Sharing 
Dame Fiona Caldicott affirmed in her 2013 report on information governance that 
“The duty to share can be as important as the duty to protect patient 
confidentiality.”[33] 
Data sharing within the EU should not be obstructed because of differences in data 
protection law, under the principles of the Digital Single Market and Article 1(2) of the 
Data Protection Directive. Data portability and data sharing is an issue with 
healthcare data,[34] which the epSOS project attempted to address.[35] The GDPR 
addresses data portability under Article 20, stating that the data subject has the right 
to receive their data in an appropriate format without hindrance and for data to be 
transferred between data controllers where technically feasible. The Bundestag is 
currently considering an eHealth bill with the same aim of improving portability of 
data.[36] This will facilitate the ability of patients to move between healthcare 
providers without unnecessary duplication of tests. 
Conclusions 
The Digital Single Market aims for improved data sharing across the EU which will 
facilitate cross-border healthcare and research. Harmonisation will be improved 
under the GDPR with a concomitant raising of standards for some countries, 
although there is still room for national differences according to the reasonable 
expectations of different publics. This advance makes cross-border projects more 
easily ethically justifiable and more feasible.[37] The requirements for anonymisation 
have not been changed, except to clarify that pseudonymised data must still be 
considered as personal data. The GDPR will facilitate medical research, except 
where it is research not considered in the public interest. In that case, more 
demanding requirements for anonymisation will entail either true anonymisation or 
consent. It is likely there will be more projects that require either consent or 
authorisation, since many projects currently use pseudonymisation. There is still an 
unresolved issue over third parties with access to pseudonymised data. 
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